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PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: We are very happy and pleased to have
our next speaker, Dermot Groome, on our law school faculty. He brings
a refreshing perspective to this very important subject. Dermot started
his career with District Attorney Robert Morgenthau in the Manhattan
District Attorney's Office, one of the largest, busiest prosecution offices
in the country. He also used his skills to work for human rights groups
for several years prior to being called to the ICTY where he was one of
its principal prosecutors in the Milogevi6 case.
Dermot brings refreshing enthusiasm, great knowledge and skill to
the subject. He carefully treads the difficult path of litigating in a court
which is neither common law or civil law in its procedure, but an
amalgam of both systems. He has addressed very difficult adjustments
and accommodations that have to be made in merging the two procedural
systems-no jury trials, dossiers, etc. He excels as an educator. He's
been called upon by international agencies and countries around the
world to help train a new generation of litigators possessing these special
skills. He is indeed a rare breed. Please give a warm welcome to our
colleague Dermot Groome.
Introduction-Why We Must Define a Theoretical Basis
As long as I practice law I will have a vivid memory of a series of
meetings I had in the spring of 2001-meetings with my staff of lawyers
and investigators in the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. I had set before
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them the task of identifying crimes which they considered essential for
the Bosnia indictment against Slobodan Milogevi6. We had evidence of
so many crimes I decided to limit the indictment to the crimes which
occurred in only a small number of the multitude of municipalities in
which crimes occurred. Before I implemented this admittedly arbitrary
criterion, I gave my staff an opportunity to convince me why a particular
crime simply had to be in the indictment. I will never forget the looks of
disgust as I dropped the horrific crimes they had labored to investigate.
My goal at that stage was to draft the smallest, most efficient indictment
possible that reflected the different crimes Milogevi6 was responsible
for-crimes like murder, rape and destruction of religious property and
also reflected the ways in which crimes were committed-for example
through political structures, the army, the police and paramilitaries.
So the large body of crimes was dispassionately whittled down to
what I believed to be the absolute minimum number. When the
indictment was made public there was a loud outcry from victims'
groups criticizing us for having omitted many notorious crimes. During
the trial the court continually challenged us to reduce the size of our case
and each day we held a meeting reviewing the previous day's gains and
considering how we might further prune our indictment.
The first great experiment in international criminal justice was of
course Nuremberg-Representatives of the four victors US, UK, France
and the Soviet Union struggled with the same issue of how to
appropriately reflect criminal acts of such magnitude in an efficient trial
process. Jackson suggested that the task could be accomplished by
adapting the best features of the two major systems-the adversarial and
the inquisitorial. Employing the principles of efficiency and fairness
they selected the best of both, merging them to create the first truly
international criminal trial. The principles of fairness and efficiency
have remained, for the most part the primary bench marks-guide posts
for improving our international trial system at the ad hoc and hybrid
tribunals as well as the International Criminal Court.
I come to this podium today to speak about what I believe the future
of international criminal justice to be. How I envisage it will develop
and what I believe to be necessary in order for it to reach its full
potential. As we proceeded through the prosecution case, constantly
beset by Milogevic's illness and other delays that are simply an inherent
part of large international criminal trials-those of us involved with the
case came to see that despite our best efforts at designing an efficient
prosecution we were still left with a case that exceeded the international
community's patience.
The principles of efficiency and fairness have taken us as far as they
might. A murder trial for a single victim before a hard-driving judge in
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Manhattan usually takes one to two weeks. In Milogevi6, our proof of a
serious massacre would most often be introduced with a single witness in
a couple of hour-very often the prosecution's evidence was nothing
more than spending a few minutes to ask a witness to attest to their
written statement and then making the witness available to Milogevid for
cross-examination. While some may disagree-I do not believe the
Bosnia cases against Milogevi6 could have been proven more efficiently
under our present system of international criminal trials.
We have had these trials in sufficient numbers and under sufficient
circumstances that we can now begin to re-evaluate the theoretical basis
of these trials. To define what we are trying to accomplish through them
with precision and then develop the best procedures to implement those
goals. While our inquiry must not capriciously abandon the time-tested
goals and methods of its ancestral roots it must not be bound with an
unreflective filial devotion. It is only after we carefully define that
theoretical basis that we can realize the full potential of international
criminal justice. With the time I have, let me suggest four principles that
are integral to that basis and invite you to imagine with me how our trial
methodology might evolve as a result.
The future of international criminal justice must spring from its own
theoretical basis-and depart from being a process that has been cobbled
together from the adversarial and inquisitorial systems designed to
achieve different aims.
Practical Considerations
Let me recognize at the outset the important hermeneutical
considerations involved in this process. Across the broad spectrum of
different legal cultures, there are different conceptions of core concepts
such as "fairness," the "right to confrontation," "the right to selfrepresentation."
These concepts do not share a common universal
definition nor are they static. An understanding of their meaning is not
independent of what the interpreter brings to the interpretation. These
differences become most apparent when we try to merge different legal
traditions to develop a single international criminal process.
During a difficult session of negotiations at the London Conference,
where the Allies gathered to design the first international criminal trial,
Justice Jackson suggested that that their different ideas of what
constituted a "fair trial" might prove to be irreconcilable and that it
would be better to agree in London that an international criminal process
was impossible rather than demonstrate it in Nuremberg.
Like my colleagues from other systems, I feel the same visceral
discomfort each time I ventured out from my own legal culture. During
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the Milogevi6 case when it became clear that acting as his own attorney,
combined with his poor health was dictating the pace of the trial the
prosecution team discussed at length the question of imposing counsel.
While my colleague, an experienced prosecutor from Germany thought it
was a sensible solution and entirely consistent with her legal culturebeing from the U.S., I was very troubled by it and openly considered
whether it was a position I could ethically advocate.
While core values like fairness serve as a compass, permeating all
that we do as lawyers they can also stifle earnest attempts to improve the
adjudication process and can impede the healthy and necessary
development of legal systems.
Changes that implicate these core values, are difficult not only
because they challenge deeply held notions of justice and fairness but
because they pose a threat to us-for to consider the merits of another
methodology is to critically reflect on whether our own method is truly
fair.
The late judge May was the presiding judge over much of the
Milogevi6 trial. He was also a respected author of several important
books on evidence. In applying an essentially adversarial conception of
fairness to the Milogevi6 defense case he determined that fairness
required that Milogevi6 be given the same amount of time the
prosecution used in presenting its case. At the outset it seemed like a
sensible and unassailably fair way of proceeding-careful calculations
were made to implement this decision. But as the case dragged on and it
became clear that Milogevi6 was using this time not so much to contest
the Prosecution's case but to make political statements, we on the
prosecution came to realize that this generous allotment of time actually
did little to further the goal of "fairness." I suspect it contributed little to
the judge's talk of fairly determining the issues before them.
The future of international criminal justice calls us to develop our
own conceptions-to redefine core concepts of our respective legal
traditions. To find new nuanced conceptions that reflect not only the
historical but the evolving concepts of international criminal justice. To
use the language of Hans Gadamer we must engage in a hermeneutical
"conversation" in which we come to accept "the full value of what is
alien and opposed to" our own unique understanding of these concepts.
It is only then we can have what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons"a commonly shared understanding of international criminal law's core
concepts.
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The Principles
Principle 1: Implementing InternationalNorms and Policies
Let me describe the first of the four principles that define the
theoretical basis of international criminal trials. This most fundamental
and animating principle is the implementation of international norms.
There is now a large comprehensive body of international criminal
norms embodied in numerous treaties, in customary law and in the
jurisprudence of the tribunals. Together this creates the corpus of
substantive law which is applied in international criminal courts. This
body of law reflects some of the most important norms and policies that
define us as a global civilization and that we as an international
community seek to promulgate.
These norms fall into two broad
substantive categories. The first category as articulated in the Geneva
Conventions and customary principles governing the conduct of war
recognizes that as long as armed conflict is an inescapable part of
international relations we must mitigate its effects whenever possible.
The second category as embodied in crimes against humanity and
genocide protect the integrity of the individual and the most fundamental
of human rights from wholesale infringement. These policies establish
baseline standards governing the treatment of all people and sanction
those who bear individual criminal responsibility for transgressing these
normative boundaries.
The UN Security Council in Resolution 808/1993 recognized the
relationship between the violation of these norms and the threat to
international peace and security. The two ad hoc tribunals have the
primary purpose of furthering peace and security through the
enforcement of these norms. The preamble of the Rome Statute reminds
us that grave violations of international law "threaten the peace, security
and well-being of the world."
How do we best implement and enforce these policies? How do we
enforce them in a way that best secures the peace, security and wellbeing of the world?
Perhaps the best place to begin is to remind ourselves of the
essential characteristics of the adversarial and inquisitorial systemsremind ourselves of their essential theoretical distinctions. Both systems
have developed over relatively long periods, worked out substantial
imperfections and are accepted today as two fair and effective ways of
adjudicating criminal liability.
I recognize the work of John Langbein and Mirjam Dama~ka in
articulating the theoretical bases of our two primary systems of
adjudication-the adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
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The adversarial system, tracing its origins to 1 31h Century England
established a forum in which opposing parties could square off before an
impartial judge to settle a dispute. A judge that was uncorrupted by
advance knowledge or some loyalty to one of the parties. The goal and
method was designed to be a "fair contest" between two perhaps
unequally situated parties. To take two possibly disparate adversaries
and set them loose in a forum in which they could have a "fair fight." In
time, lawyers were given a central role in these proceedings and we now
have a system in which the formulation of the allegations, the conduct of
the investigation, the production of proof, the testing of that proof all
remain in the control of the two opposing sides represented by attorneys.
This intentionally partisan process culminates climatically on their "day
in court"-the concentration of months of pre-trial preparation into a
condensed dramatic courtroom battle. The judge or jury's role is largely
passive. Our faith in the adversarial system lies largely in the belief that
the truth will emerge during this fair contest.
Is it the goal of international criminal trials to make the international
community and the lone individual defendant equal combatants in a fair
contest? Can we ever reduce a contest between the international
community and an individual defendant to a fair contest on the same
terms envisaged by the early architects of the adversarial system? They
might remark today that we have asked this simple solution to simple
controversies to do something it was never intended to do. While
international judges, in my experience, can and most often do ensure that
courtroom proceedings conform to traditional conceptions of adversarial
fairness their largely passive role in the overall process leaves them
unable to more proactively engage the process in a way that uncovers the
truth more efficiently and fairly. Caught in the paradigm of trial as
"dispute resolution" they are intentionally constrained from developing a
truth seeking process that is fair.
Milogevi6 saw the trial as a "dispute"-a debate on the validity of
NATO's interventions in the Balkans and its bombing of Serbia. In fact,
it was the international community seeking to fairly determine whether
he had violated international norms. The adversarial aspects of the trial
process, better suited for dispute resolution were easily manipulated by
Milogevi6 to his ends.
The inquisitorial or continental system has its roots in canonical law
and was developed by the Catholic Church to implement church policy.
As it was adapted for use in secular society it developed into a system of
investigation and adjudication that entrusted the task of investigation, the
introduction of evidence and the adjudication of facts to trained impartial
professionals. In its modem form, the inquisitorial system charges a
judicial officer with the task of investigating an event in a fair and
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balanced way, impartially assessing evidence to determine the truth and
fairly applying international policies and norms expressed in the law.
The "day in court" is replaced with a multi-stage process designed to
avoid the inflamed passions of a dramatic courtroom battle with the
careful deliberate dissection and evaluation of evidence. The truth is not
entrusted to a "fair contest" but to a "fair process" guided by an impartial
hand with input from the prosecution and the defense.
The theoretical basis of international criminal trials is not to create a
"fair contest" to resolve a dispute-but to accurately and fairly identify,
investigate and adjudicate which individuals have violated international
norms. It is my assertion that accurately identifying and adjudicating
transgressions of international norms is the foundational and animating
principle of international criminal trials. Further, once we accept this we
must recognize the affinity that exists between the international criminal
trial and its inquisitorial parent. International criminal trial procedure
must abandon its reliance on the adversarial process to yield the truth and
develop its own methodology to uncover the truth in a process that fairly
strikes the balance between the rights of the defendant, the victim and the
international community.
In doing this we see some tools of the continental judge are well
suited for the international criminal judge.
The dossier.
In the
inquisitorial model the dossier is the repository of the evidence. The
process of investigation and evaluation generate a body of credible and
reliable evidence that can form the basis of later deliberations. The
inflexible ban on advance knowledge of a case in the adversarial system
prevents the use of dossiers-something that has been carried over to
international criminal trials.
General Nikitchenko of the Soviet
delegation at the London Conference was one of the first to point out the
fallacy of procedures designed to shield judges from allegations covered
so broadly by the media.
Recognizing this principle requires us to redefine the roles of the
judge, the prosecutor and even the accused in their respective roles at
trial.
The Prosecutor is not a partisan adversary but a judicial officer
charged foremost with determining the truth. My old boss at the
Manhattan DA's office espoused this view, he used to impress upon us
this vital responsibility of a prosecutor. There were several occasions
during the course of my career there when, my task became to identify
and uncover the evidence that would reveal the truth and exonerate a
wrongfully accused defendant. An obligation incorporated into the ICC
in Article 54. Towards the end of the prosecution case in Milogevi6
when my staff tired of combing through newly acquired documents for
evidence that might help Milogevi6 I reminded them of our duty and
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reminded them if we were to discover reliable evidence that exculpated
Milogevi6 our responsibility would require us to amend our theory of the
case even if that meant seeking his exoneration-while certainly
embarrassing it would be the only honorable course given our duty as
prosecutors. Methods must be developed that insulate international
prosecutors from the temptations of partiality, the seduction of prominent
convictions and craft a role different from the traditional role of a
prosecutor as adversary.
Lest you think I am advocating for a wholesale shift towards
inquisitorial methods-I am not. I am advocating for clearly articulating
the goals of international criminal trials and then shaping the methods to
fit-many will be adaptations of already existing methods. For example,
I would abandon the obligation of a continental prosecutor to bring all
charges supported by prima facie evidence. In its place I would adopt
the practice of many prosecutors in adversarial systems that they exercise
their discretion to only initiate charges supported by prima facie evidence
for which they believe there is a strong probability of success. A
discretionary decision involving something substantially more than a
mere prima facie case.
Principle 2: Minimize the Excesses of War
My second principle. On June 24, 1859 Henri Dunant, the founder
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stood boot-deep in
blood in the aftermath of Solferino surrendering to the apparent
inevitability of war he sought a way to minimize the suffering it
occasioned. Integral to the theoretical basis of international criminal
justice must be a consideration as to how its methods further this
paramount purpose of international humanitarian law.
While the
eradication of impunity hopefully becomes a deterrent to a violation of
international norms-the methodology we employ must be informed by
and contribute to a reduction of the excesses of armed conflict. The
future of international criminal justice must not only seek to hold
violators accountable but must proactively make it more difficult to
violate the laws and customs of war.
Imagine with me how this might be reflected in methodology.
Recall the recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel Defense Force
and the bombing of the apartment complex in Cana. A Human Rights
Watch investigation determined that a massive bomb caused a building
to collapse on dozens of civilians mostly children. They did not find
evidence that the building and its civilians were being used as shields by
Hezbollah. Is it possible for us to imagine that a commander who orders
the bombing of a clearly identifiable civilian target does so knowing that
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he or she will have a legal obligation to explain their decision? The right
to remain silent is one of the cornerstones in the protection of our civil
liberties. Presently, there is no basis in international law for abrogating
the right to remain silent in any way. It is now deeply ingrained in most
modem systems of criminal justice.
Can we at least temporarily suspend our reflexive rejection of
anything that would threaten this inviolable principle and examine the
reasons underlying it in a consideration of possibly recalibrating the right
in a way that appropriately balances the right against self-incrimination
and the unjustified taking of civilian life? If during the course of this fair
inquiry into the truth an international court determines that there is
uncontested prima facie evidence that a non-hostile civilian target was
deliberately targeted by an accused, resulting in the loss of civilian lifeif a court determines that this point has been reached-is our offense at
the thought of the court asking the accused "why" really justified? Is it
so abhorrent that silence in the face of such evidence may be interpreted
by judges as the absence of any legal justification for targeting the
civilian structure?
Is it fundamentally unfair for the international community to require
an explanation from those persons with uncontested authority and
responsibility for targeting decisions to justify the intentional taking of
civilian life?
Principle3: Reconciliation and Integration with Local Justice Efforts
Let me leave this principle-a process that itself mitigates the
excesses of war and describe my third principle. As Ambassador Okun
has eloquently described-furthering reconciliation is an important
reason why we engage in international criminal justice. We must repair
the fissures of war. The oppressed must once again live among those
who were complicit in oppression. The children of the ethnically
cleansed must play in the same school yard as the children of the ethnic
cleansers.
We expect international criminal justice to make a
constructive contribution to this process.
We humbly accept that
international criminal justice can only contribute partially to this
process-reconciliation must also depend upon reconstitution of national
criminal justice capable of dealing with these international crimes.
The time for an international tribunal to examine how its proof may
be used in local proceedings is not in the midst of a closing strategy but
in designing the architecture of international trials. The large investment
of resources for these trials can only be justified if they further
reconciliation in fact and provide dividends to those courts that complete
the task by adjudicating the guilt of the majority of serious offenders.
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International Criminal Trials will always focus on only the most serious
offenders. It is a process that allows those that have killed hundreds to
fall through the sieve of international justice to the courts below. There
must be continuity of proof and method between the large international
trials and the national trials of international crimes. International trials
must advance local justice for international crimes.
If we adopt as a principal that a fair truth-seeking process replace
our adversarial contest then we can empower a judge with the tools
necessary to ascertain the truth in these situations. A judgment rendered
in this way embodies a set of reliable factual findings that can be applied
fairly as rebuttable presumptions in other cases. That can be applied to
other defendants in a way that allows them to fairly contest the accuracy
of those facts. Under the adversarial-"fair contest" model-findings
derived from a contest controlled by two opposing parties are difficult to
incorporate into the trial of a third person and still remain faithful to the
theoretical basis of the "fair contest." How can a "contest" be "fair" in
the traditional adversarial sense to a person who was not present?
Principle4: Sustainability
The last principle, of this admittedly incomplete set, which I will
speak of today is sustainability. The theoretical basis of international
trials must include the concept of sustainability. If the future of
international criminal justice is to be realized it must become
commonplace-not an extraordinary measure like the ad hoc tribunals.
It must be expected, commonplace, and sustainable.
National criminal justice systems work because they are predictable
and have moral authority. Once they become unpredictable they lose
their moral authority and begin to break down-endangering the society
itself. Sustainable international criminal justice must be certain in its
application, predictable in its process and have the moral authority of the
world community.
There is a direct relationship between the efficiency of these trials
and the universal enforcement of these prohibitions.
For these
prosecutions to have a true deterrent effect they must be conducted in a
way that can leave no doubt that the international community's resolve to
end impunity is not larger than its capacity to do so. Any consideration
of trial methods must look further than the immediate considerations of
individual trials incorporating larger strategic considerations of ensuring
predictable accountability for all senior political, military or police
official likely to commit crimes. The ICC is the most significant step to
date in this regard. Its success will depend in part upon its ability to
ensure global justice with limited resources. The goal of sustainability is
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directly dependent on developing a process that is the most efficient one
possible.
Let's examine one feature of the adversarial process with significant
implications for its efficiency. Consider three of the central functions of
an adversarial trial.
The first is the questioning of witness and
production of proof. The parties are responsible for this function. The
second function is performed by the judge-managing the trial process.
The final function for consideration is adjudicating the facts. This
function is discharged by the jury.
Now let's consider a simple robbery case where the prosecution
must prove three elements: 1) there was a theft; 2) there was force and
3) the defendant is the person who committed the act. The prosecutor
must produce evidence to prove each of these beyond reasonable doubt.
It might be that the jury early in the case has no doubt that there was a
forcible theft-a robbery. They have serious concerns with the identity
of the perpetrator and are interested anxious to hear all possible evidence
in this regard.
The Prosecutor, unable to speak with the jury, does not know this.
He therefore, in the prudent discharge of his duties pedantically adduces
all of his evidence for each element lest a reasonable doubt germinate in
the mind of a juror. What would happen if the trier of fact-if the juror
in my example could say, "We have all the evidence we need to decide
the first two elements. What we need now is all the evidence available
on the issue of identification. How much more efficient does our
robbery trial become when we empower the fact-finder to direct the
inquiry rather than stifling our fact-finder in name of impartiality. By
combining these segregated functions we increase the efficiency of the
trial process.
After having considered the efficiencies gained in a simple robbery
trial, consider the exponentially greater efficiencies that can be achieved
in a case on the scale of the Milogevi6 case. The trial would have taken a
very different course if the Chamber had been empowered to more
actively direct the inquiry in a way that met their needs as finders of fact.
We, as prosecutors, being forced to blindly anticipate their questions,
their potential doubts were compelled to introduce not necessarily the
evidence the Chamber most wanted or needed to decide the case but
what we perceived they most needed and wanted.
We invited the Chamber on several occasions to take a greater role
in directing the focus of the inquiry.
They declined for obvious
reasons-expressing a view that we presented sufficient evidence on an
issue would create an impression (abhorrent in a adversarial system) that
the trier of fact had a view of the evidence before hearing all of the
evidence and the arguments of both parties. The court was inextricably
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shackled to adversarial notions designed for a national court. Can we
not entrust professional judges to keep an open mind with respect to the
guilt of an accused and yet still determine when they have heard enough
evidence on a particular issue?
Conclusion
I leave you now with these four principles-and invite discussion
regarding their implications. They are by no means comprehensive. I
am sure my audience here and scholars and practitioners elsewhere can
identify important principles that must also be part of the theoretical
basis of international criminal trials. It is important that we fully and
earnestly engage in the task of defining this theoretical basis-identify its
benchmarks so we can be guided as we struggle to correct the
inadequacies of today's methods and develop new methodologies.
International criminal justice must mature into a juridical entity
intentionally designed to realize its unique mandate and potential.
The test of our success is whether this nascent legal system fairly
adjudicates individual responsibility, whether it effectively and
uniformly enforces international norms, whether it mitigates war's
unconscionable results, whether it furthers reconciliation and that it
achieves all of this in a sustainable way. International criminal justice
must establish with certainty and predictably our resolve to end
impunity-it must become expected and routine.
The future of
international criminal law lies in it becoming our ordinary response to
extraordinary crimes.

